BIRMINGHAM: And the winner is … Vladimir Putin. If there were international affairs Oscars in the category of biggest return for no investment, the Russian leader would have won it hands down, after the fiery blow-up between United States President Donald Trump and Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelenskyy on Friday (Feb 28).
The rift deepened on Monday, with Mr Trump blasting Mr Zelenskyy for saying that the end of the war was still “very, very far away” when he should be “more appreciative” of US support. The White House also confirmed that Washington was pausing military aid to Ukraine. Does this mean it’s all over for Ukraine?
The minerals deal – initially floated by Mr Zelenskyy and then eagerly embraced by Mr Trump – certainly seems off, for now at least. And gone with it is any chance of an American security guarantee, however tenuous that might have been in the first instance.
The only upside, if you can call it that, is that there is now absolute clarity that the United States under Mr Trump cannot be relied upon as a partner when it comes to the future of Ukraine.
Even if Mr Zelenskyy and Mr Trump can somehow miraculously mend their relationship, it is not clear whether any deal would be worth the mea culpa and additional concessions that would be required of Ukraine. Mr Trump, after all, has made his own unpredictability – or maybe just his poorly disguised lack of self-control – a key feature of his approach to foreign policy.
This is worth bearing in mind, in light of discussions that Ukraine may need a different leader, one more committed to peace than winning back lost territory, as US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz suggested over the weekend. A different Ukrainian leader would still have to deal with the same US president.
All eyes are now on Europe, where the near certainty of fundamentally altered transatlantic relations seems to have finally sunk in.
The defence summit urgently convened in London on Mar 2 brought some concrete results, including a pledge from the United Kingdom to supply Ukraine with air defence missiles worth £1.6 billion (US$2 billion).
Plans for European security guarantees – provided by a “coalition of the willing” across the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – are also beginning to take shape. A Special European Council on Mar 6, is likely to reveal further details on how much European leaders are willing to mobilise, and how soon.
Funding these endeavours will still prove challenging. One avenue available to Europe remains seizing billions in frozen Russian assets, not just using the interest they generate.
In Germany, where talks on forming a new government coalition are underway following the country’s Feb 23 elections, there is talk of a €400 billion (US$421 billion) defence fund. Other options include a European rearmament bank and a common European defence fund, both built around the “coalition of the willing” and thus likely able to circumvent traditionally cumbersome EU decision-making.
Some of these efforts could also be kick-started by re-directing the €93 billion left in the EU’s COVID-19 recovery fund. The surge in the share prices of major European defence contractors, including BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce and Rheinmetall, indicates that there is confidence in the private sector that European states will procure more military equipment.
This, in turn, is likely to lead to more corporate investment in Europe’s defence industrial base in anticipation of higher sales and profits.
But time is running out for both Ukraine and Europe. Any Trump deal with Mr Putin might lift American sanctions against Russia, permanently cut Ukraine off US support, and limit – perhaps completely revoke – the US security guarantee to Europe through NATO and with it any effective deterrence against further Russian aggression.
It may not come to this, at least not yet. But in light of how the Trump administration is treating all of its once-close allies and partners, such an outcome cannot be dismissed as a far-flung, improbable scenario.
For now, Mr Putin may think that he can just sit back and enjoy the chaos. But part of what likely led to Mr Trump’s outbursts in the White House is the frustration in his relationship with the Kremlin.
Moscow is not exactly losing its war against Ukraine, but it is also definitely not winning.
The pace of territorial gains has slowed over the past few weeks, but this might also just be the calm before the storm of a Russian spring offensive. In the meantime, daily Russian airstrikes, often involving hundreds of drones, have continued unabated, damaging Ukrainian infrastructure and morale.
The challenges that Ukraine and its European partners face are significant, but not insurmountable. A small European peacekeeping force in Ukraine is conceivable – both as a tripwire force and as a way to bolster especially Ukrainian air defences against unrelenting Russian attacks.
This might buy Ukraine and Europe time to build up their defence industrial capacities and simply produce more arms and ammunition. This would make deterrence, even with a diminished US security guarantee, look credible.
Key European countries – the UK, France and post-election Germany – have been galvanised by the deterioration of transatlantic relations. With the predictable exception of Hungary’s Viktor Orban, European unity has held up well in the face of an increasingly hostile Trump administration.
All the signs are that Europe will finally rise to the challenge of becoming a geopolitical, and not just geo-economic player, even if this will not happen overnight.
Mr Putin may therefore think that he can still gain more on the battlefield than at the negotiation table and is likely to draw out the process of any negotiations. He clearly does not betray any sense of urgency on the part of Russia to end this war.
But Mr Trump has said more than once that he wants peace, including after the acrimonious meeting with Mr Zelenskyy. The US president is unpredictable, but on this occasion, he should be taken both seriously and literally.
Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security at the University of Birmingham and Head of the Department of Political Science and International Studies.
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